2:17 Why are so many people (including Fred) down on John Mearsheimer?
15:21 Bob: Explaining bad behavior is not the same as justifying it
30:16 How the US eroded international law—and why it matters
44:16 Did US policy make Russia’s invasion of Ukraine more likely?
58:06 NATO’s role in Ukraine before the invasion
1:21:31 How would the US respond to a China-Mexico military alliance?
1:34:08 Henry Kissinger’s peace proposal
1:42:38 Impediments to productive debate on US foreign policy
Robert Wright (Bloggingheads.tv, The Evolution of God, Nonzero, Why Buddhism Is True) and Fred Kaplan (Slate, Dark Territory). Recorded January 5, 2023.
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An Epic Debate on Ukraine and US Foreign Policy (Robert Wright & Fred Kaplan)
I thoroughly enjoyed this epic debate. In addition to cognitive empathy, maybe your framework on diplomacy rests on what one could call a type of ‘dependent origination’ or ‘interdependent co-arising’ to use Buddhist phrasing?
If I am following along correctly your argument goes something like this (I am oversimplifying): In the 1990s when the United States became “the” Super Power, it had the chance to model diplomatic relations based primarily on the rule of international law — by following international law. Your examples of Iraq and Kosovo clearly showed that is not what the U.S. did. This disregard set a precedent of behavior that other countries could follow (too complicated to get into why in this post). It’s analogous, though not exactly the same, as Trump as president setting a certain tone and hyperbolic speech that filtered down to other politicians, journalists and even dinner conversations with friends. Trump didn’t make (as in force) other people to adopt his demeanor and tactics and they are responsible for their actions, but Trump set a precedent.
Less people seem to disagree with the Trump example, but wow so few want to look at the foreign policy example. As with Kaplan, most people think pointing to this ‘interdependent co-arising’ phenomenon on the diplomatic stage is excusing other nations for breaking the law, when instead it’s trying to point out a pattern that we can work to change — and not make a current situation worse by demonizing an advisory. Maybe understanding ‘interdependent co-arising’ goes hand-in-hand with cognitive empathy? It sure seems even harder to get across.
If talking about the war in Ukraine, you are making many mistakes, especially about Ukraine, Russia, Eastern Europe, etc. Maybe someday I'll write about them. But for Christ's sake, get your facts straight if you are talking about American action.
1) Burns did not predict anything. Ukraine and Georgia applied for Membership Action Plan (this is not membership). Burns wrote a cable telling what Russians (Lavrov, etc.) are thinking and talking about this application. Burns is just retelling what Russians are saying. He is not making his own predictions, he is not making a personal assessment, his not saying to Bush "don't do it". In fact, there is nothing newsworthy in Burns cable, this is all public knowledge. (And by the way, the NATO summit rejected Ukrainian and Georgian applications.)
2)No missiles were placed in Poland and the Czech Republic. It is a 20-year-old plan, much discussed, delayed, rejected, stalled, etc. But no missiles so far.