Guardians of the Blob-Based Order
Guardians of the Blob-Based Order
Plus: Sam Altman’s unmasking, Ukraine’s nuclear-war-risking tactic, US accidentally builds league of autocracies, Putin's up for peace talks, important NZN announcement, and more!
Note: For various reasons (including a meditation retreat I’ll be on next week), we won’t be publishing the newsletter during June. But (1) All paid subscribers will get a one-month credit; and (2) The podcasts will continue—complete with the bonus Overtime segments for paid subscribers. Plus, we’re about to expand the NZN team, and NZN content, and the results will become visible as the summer wears on. See you after the Fourth of July weekend! —RW
For years, American leaders have lectured the world about the importance of upholding the “rules-based international order,” and for years America has been a leading violator of the rules. And for years the fact of this hypocrisy has barely penetrated mainstream discourse. Though the gap between America’s words and deeds does get mentioned occasionally, the US foreign policy establishment’s immune system—honed by eons of evolution to fight off ideas that could cause cognitive dissonance—has tended to marginalize people who get very exercised about the gap.
So it’s always noteworthy when a prominent mainstream voice dwells on this hypocrisy, and last week Gideon Rachman, chief foreign policy commentator of the Financial Times, devoted a whole column to it. “America’s own actions are undermining vital parts of the rules-based order,” he wrote. As a result, “In large parts of the world, America’s claim to be upholding the rules-based international order is treated with derision.”
So far, so good. But then Rachman proposes a solution to the problem, and at this point his column starts to resemble an Onion parody of Blobthink. And there lies the column’s value. Rachman’s piece is an excellent example of how, on those rare occasions when foreign policy elites acknowledge the magnitude of America’s hypocrisy, their instinct is to paper over it rather than grapple with its implications.
Rachman’s recommended way of closing the gap between words and deeds is this: The US, rather than start complying with the rules, should just quit talking so much about them. He recommends “dialing down the rhetoric about the rules-based order” and talking more about “defending the free world”—which, he says, is a “more accurate and comprehensible description of what western foreign policy is actually about.”
Actually, President Biden already talks quite a bit about defending the free world; the global struggle against autocracy is his go-to foreign policy theme. And, actually, it’s not clear that this is any “more accurate” a description of US foreign policy than “defending the rules based order” is. At the moment, for example, Biden is promising murderous Saudi autocrat Mohammed bin Salman that he’ll get US security guarantees and nuclear technology if he’ll join other Arab autocrats who have earned American largesse by recognizing Israel.
Still, there’s a coherent logic behind Rachman’s proposal, and to appreciate how insidious the proposal is, you need to first understand that logic.
Rachman focuses on two examples of American disregard for rules. First, “the 100 per cent tariffs that the Biden administration has imposed on Chinese electric vehicles are virtually impossible to reconcile with international rules on trade.” Second, there’s the International Criminal Court’s indictment of Benjamin Netanyahu. “Rather than supporting the court’s effort to enforce international law, [Secretary of State Antony] Blinken told the US Congress that the administration would consider imposing sanctions on the ICC.”
Rachman figures that if you just change rhetorical frames—say that the central US aim is defending freedom, not rules—these policies don’t seem so bad: We’re slapping tariffs on China because China’s autocratic. And we’re defending Netanyahu because Israel’s a democracy. Freedom is on the march!
I suspect that Rachman is overestimating the persuasiveness of this kind of rhetoric, but that’s not my big problem with his plan to camouflage continued American rule breaking. My big problem is that he’s failing to confront the most important implications of rule breaking. And one reason he can avoid this confrontation is that the kinds of rules he focuses on aren’t the most fundamental kind.
Granted, rules about the conduct of international trade and the conduct of war are important. But they’re not as important as the core of the UN Charter, the principle that, more than any other principle, the UN was designed to uphold: the rule against transborder aggression. A world without war—the world the UN’s architects envisioned—is, in addition to its obvious virtues, the sturdiest foundation on which to build respect for rules more broadly, ranging from existing rules on trade to new rules that could control bioweapons and other currently expanding technological threats.
Believe it or not, there was a time, right after the Cold War ended, when the rule against transborder aggression seemed as if it might become enduringly enforceable. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 was a textbook example of enforcement. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, and the UN Security Council—which had been paralyzed during the Cold War by the fact that the US and USSR both had veto power—authorized the use of force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait. A US-led coalition, acting under that authority, expelled them.
Almost no one now involved in foreign policy discourse appreciates the potential for transformation that existed at that moment. Many of these people weren’t yet adults, and, anyway, few of the adults were focused on building a world in which the rule of law would govern relations among nations. Most were either earnestly focusing their advocacy on democracy promotion or cynically trying to conceal the extension of American hegemony with that kind of advocacy.
I don’t think the few of us who had a different vision—who advocated revival of the UN Charter and the nurturing of respect for international law—were being hopelessly idealistic. The 1990s could have been a magic moment in world history. The US emerged from the Cold War unrivaled in military and economic might and in ideological authority and so possessed enormous power to shape global norms. Complying with the UN Charter and other manifestations of international law could have become one of those norms. George H.W. Bush’s decision to go to the Security Council for authorization to roll back Saddam Hussein’s aggression could have been pivotal.
But the same country that led this enforcement of the UN’s most important rule then started to break it. Though NATO’s intervention in Bosnia in the 1990s was authorized by the Security Council, its intervention in Serbia in 1999 wasn’t. And, more infamously, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 wasn’t. America’s disrespect of national borders continues today—in, for example, the US troop presence in Syria.
Had America been blessed with two or three visionary presidents in a row, I think the norm of respecting the UN Charter could today be strong, and the world could be a very different place. For example: I think several hundred thousand recently killed Ukrainians and Russians could still be alive, and Ukraine could still have its pre-2014 borders.
Amply substantiating that claim would take something closer to a book than to an issue of this newsletter. I’d have to chart the long deterioration of relations between Russia and the US, Vladimir Putin’s growing sense that his country wasn’t getting the respect it deserved, and his coalescing conviction that the “rules based order” was being enforced selectively, to Russia’s detriment. Also, in constructing an alternative history with a happy ending, I’d have to assume bursts of American wisdom at key points—like, for example, Bill Clinton actually listening to all the Russia experts who were telling him not to launch the expansion of NATO. And, along the way, I’d have to laboriously undermine the prevailing American narrative about Putin—that he started out as a pretty bad guy and then took a turn for the worse and kept heading in that direction.
Since doing all this isn’t practical at the moment, let me at least try to convince you that the guardians of this prevailing American narrative about Putin are not to be trusted. Let’s take, for example, David Sanger, the famous and esteemed national security correspondent for the New York Times who just published a book called New Cold Wars. Sanger was recently on a podcast in which he said the following:
The assumption at the time [in 2002] was that we were on a pretty steady road to a much better relationship with the Russians. And that proceeded until 2007, when Putin showed up at the Munich Security Conference, and declared for the first time, “There are parts of Russia that have been wrested from it, that actually belong to Mother Russia, and we're going to get them back.”
This is nothing short of a hallucination. I defy anyone to read the text of the 2007 Munich speech and find anything remotely like a declaration that Putin planned to repossess former Russian lands. It’s just not there.
What Putin did say in that speech was that the US was running roughshod over the world—breaking the rules and interfering in the internal affairs of nations, heedless of the consequences. If the world didn’t “leave behind this disdain for international law,” he warned, it would wind up “in a dead end, and the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied.”
Putin also warned that NATO’s ever-expanding borders were a problem for Russia, and he made the accurate point (in what presumably was a reference to the 1999 Serbian intervention) that a decision by NATO to use force didn’t make the use of force legal. “I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force… is the Charter of the United Nations,” Putin said.
At this point Putin had been in power for six years and had never invaded another country. The following year NATO, under pressure from George W. Bush, declared that Georgia and Ukraine would become members of NATO. And this happened as the US was pushing for recognition of Kosovo’s independence—a byproduct of that illegal 1999 NATO intervention that had stuck in Putin’s craw. A few months later Russia was at war with Georgia—and, though Russia wasn’t technically the aggressor, it hadn’t exactly discouraged the conflict; this was a sign that things were changing.
Again, convincing you that things could have turned out differently would take a long time. For now all I ask is that you not trust the David Sangers of the world, the guardians of the Blob’s narrative and thus the enemies of a true rule-based order. I don’t think that they’re lying—that they’re consciously, intentionally misleading you—but they’re definitely not consistently telling you the truth. And one result is that a lot of consequential American misbehavior gets obscured from public view.
Also: Please don’t listen to people, like Gideon Rachman, who advise America to camouflage its lawlessness with rhetoric about its solemn devotion to defending democracy. This is the framing of a new cold war, and that’s where it’s leading us. And the last cold war didn’t work out well. —RW
Two weeks ago, NZN featured a piece called “Sam Altman’s Very Good, Very Bad Week.” Since then the badness for OpenAI’s CEO has continued. A quick update:
1) Scarlett Johansson complained that Altman stole her voice, kind of.
2) Vox reported that OpenAI subjects departing employees to highly restrictive nondisclosure and non-disparagement agreements, and employees who don't sign them can lose millions in vested equity. Altman said he was shocked to hear such a thing was going on in his company and promised reform.
3) Former OpenAI board member Helen Toner called Altman a liar, among other unflattering things. Toner was one of the board members who fired Altman in November and then left the board after Altman was restored to the throne. In an interview on the TED AI Show podcast this week, Toner said:
For years, Sam had made it really difficult for the board to actually do that job [of carrying out the company’s public-interest mission], by withholding information, misrepresenting things that were happening at the company, in some cases outright lying to the board…
It’s things like, when ChatGPT came out in November 22, the board was not informed in advance about that; we learned about ChatGPT on Twitter. Sam didn’t inform the board that he owned the OpenAI startup fund, even though he constantly was claiming to be an independent board member with no financial interest in the company. On multiple occasions, he gave us inaccurate information about the small number of formal safety processes that the company did have in place…
...After years of this kind of thing, all four of us who fired him came to the conclusion that we just couldn't believe things that Sam was telling us...
...We had this series of conversations with these executives, where the two of them suddenly started telling us about their own experiences with Sam, which they hadn't felt comfortable sharing before, but telling us how they couldn't trust him, about the toxic atmosphere he was creating, they used the phrase 'psychological abuse'... They've since tried to kind of minimize what they told us, but these were not casual conversations; they were really serious, to the point where they actually sent us screenshots and documentation of some of the instances they were telling us about of him lying and being manipulative in different situations.
A new Ukrainian military tactic is making nuclear war more likely, according to nuclear strategy experts.
On Sunday, a Ukrainian drone struck a radar facility in Russia that gives early warning of incoming ballistic missiles. And last Wednesday, a Ukrainian drone struck a different such facility. Both facilities are intended mainly to detect a nuclear strike in time for Russia to launch a counter-strike before its own nuclear forces are obliterated.
This “launch on warning” protocol, part of both Russian and American strategic doctrine, discourages both sides from launching a first strike and thus helps sustain deterrence. But it has the obvious downside of institutionalizing an itchy trigger finger—which helps explain why nuclear policy expert James Acton, in a Twitter thread, deemed the Ukrainian strikes a “bad idea.”
Everyone, Acton wrote, has an interest in Russia’s nuclear warning system staying in good working order, since a false alarm could lead Moscow to launch a nuclear strike. What’s more: If the Russians suspect that their radar is being targeted at the behest of America, which has the power to launch a devastating first strike, then the Kremlin may put its nuclear forces on high alert, “further adding to the risk.” And Russian doctrine (like American doctrine) deems even a conventional attack on its nuclear warning system grounds for a nuclear strike against the attackers, though Acton doesn’t think Putin will let the nukes fly now.
On Thursday, a week after people like Acton started sounding the alarm about this risk, the Washington Post reported that the Biden administration is concerned about it and “has conveyed its concerns to Kyiv.”
Meanwhile, the US has announced a policy change that some worry could prove escalatory: Ukraine will now be allowed to use American weapons to strike inside Russian territory—at least, in the vicinity of Kharkiv, which is under attack from artillery and rocket launchers located across the border.
The New York Times reports that this “appears to mark the first time that an American president has allowed limited military responses on artillery, missile bases and command centers inside the borders of a nuclear-armed adversary.” Putin had warned that such a policy shift could have “serious consequences” and hinted that it could lead to nuclear war.
This week, the Nonzero podcast aired one of our once-every-so-often conversations with Daniel Bessner and Derek Davison, hosts of the American Prestige podcast. The discussion focused on the Gaza war and whether Trump would be worse on the issue than Biden has been. (Bob argued yes, as he has in the newsletter.) In the Overtime segment, available to NZN members, Danny goaded Bob into gossiping about life at The New Republic during the magazine’s golden years. You can watch or listen to the episode here. NZN members can find a 20 percent subscription discount for American Prestige at the bottom of this issue of The Earthling, beyond the paywall.
Also, tonight we’re airing a new episode of Earthling Unplugged, Bob’s biweekly conversation with NZN staffer Andrew Day about items from the latest Earthling (plus a few rants, and more than a few stray thoughts). So, look for that in your podcast apps and/or on YouTube. And don’t forget to rate and review. It helps a lot!
The Wall Street Journal reports that western sanctions designed to isolate and punish America’s authoritarian adversaries have “inadvertently birthed a global shadow economy tying together democracy’s chief foes, with Washington’s primary adversary, China, at the center.” The Journal says that Beijing has boosted trade with Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea in recent years. “The bloc of sanctioned nations collectively now have the economy of scale to shield them from Washington’s financial warfare, trading everything from drones and missiles to gold and oil.”
If this dynamic sounds familiar, you may be thinking of one of NZN’s various warnings that President Biden’s framing of America’s foreign policy mission—as leader of the world’s democracies in a global, Manichaean crusade against a supposedly unified coalition of authoritarians and autocrats—could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
And as for how the Manichaean struggle for hearts and minds is going: Judging by the map below, China, leader of the league of authoritarian autocrats, is fairly well-liked outside the West.
Among non-western nations, Iran stands out for its negative perception of the rising superpower. Readers, any guess as to why Iranians are mostly negative toward China? And what else about the map stands out to you? Feel free to weigh in below, in the comments section.
Vladimir Putin is ready to halt the Ukraine war along the current battlefield lines, Reuters reports. Four Russian sources close to Putin said that he wants to negotiate a ceasefire soon but, if necessary, will take more land to pressure Kyiv to talk. According to the sources, Putin hopes to avoid another military mobilization and believes that Russia’s achievements in the war can be presented as a victory to the Russian people.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba accused Putin of sending out “phony signals” and “desperately trying to derail the Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15-16”—a Ukraine-initiated conference that Moscow is not invited to. Ukrainian and western officials say that Putin can’t be trusted to honor a ceasefire or peace deal and would use the opportunity to re-arm for a future offensive.
In Responsible Statecraft, Branko Marcetic of Jacobin magazine writes that the West should reconsider its hardline stance. “Taking advantage of Putin’s apparent openness to a ceasefire and striking a deal now, however unpleasant, will be better for everyone: for the state of Ukraine, for its people, and for the safety of the entire world.”
—By Robert Wright and Andrew Day
Earthling banner art created by Clark McGillis.
American Prestige 20 percent discount for NZN members: