Transcript Excerpts: Lyle Goldstein

Taken from Robert Wright’s conversation with military expert Lyle Goldstein.

Bob: This morning, I was reading an excerpt from Michael Lewis's forthcoming book on Sam Bankman-Fried. And it turns out that Sam Bankman-Fried had a woman who headed up his public relations, and her parents lived in Taiwan. And the book talks about a time when Bankman-Fried had met privately with former President Bill Clinton and asked him what the United States might do if China invaded Taiwan. 

And here's a quote from the book: “Whatever Clinton had told Sam had prompted him to seek her out afterward and suggest that she move her parents out of Taiwan.” Does that seem like reasonable advice given what you surmise about the likelihood of war and how war might unfold? Would you advise someone to do that?

Lyle: I would. That's a very interesting quote, Bob. Thank you for bringing it to our attention. That shows a little bit of insiders’ thinking about this… 

It’s pretty clear that we have a very dicey situation and you and I will talk through all the parameters. But I feel that the island is in very grave danger, and the people on it especially. To my estimate, unfortunately, it's quite likely—or, let's put it this way, it is certainly possible that Taiwan will look something like Ukraine or even much worse. In other words, the devastation could be total if it came to war. So, I'm definitely doing everything I can to head off this catastrophe. 

The kind of fine point of Clinton's observation and the subsequent action does seem to imply that this is out of our hands as Americans. It's just too far away. The political currents that are driving this crisis are, I think, poorly understood by Americans generally, and even American leaders.

So, to my estimate, we ought to be ultra-cautious and design all our policies accordingly. We all have many friends in Taiwan, or many of us do, and they need to act cautiously as well. That's really the best way to prevent this.

Bob: Tell me if I'm naive or confused about Chinese politics, but my assumption is that there's no way they're going to put up with loss in the long run. I mean, even if the conflict subsided, and they had to retrench and build up their military and come back in three years or something, it seems to me that it's just basically unacceptable in Chinese politics, whether at the elite level or grassroots level or whatever, for the leader to say, “Okay, we lost Taiwan.” Because, of course, China considers Taiwan to be part of China. And the irony is that we kind of halfway do as well. We do not recognize it as a sovereign nation as Ukraine was recognized, and so too for much of the world. And we have a so-called “one China policy” in which we kind of acknowledge that they consider Taiwan part of China, and as long as they work it out peacefully, that's fine with us.

So, they would think of it as a civil war in a certain sense. Do you agree with me that they're just not going to accept defeat? 

Lyle: Yes, I emphatically agree with everything you just said; you're exactly right. I've often said, if we fight a war with China over Taiwan, and even if we win, which we might… I think it's quite likely that China would redouble its efforts. 

I think even the last major DoD assessment said China spends less than 2 percent of its GDP on its military. Well, that could easily triple or even go up higher to 10 or 12 percent. China could become fully militarized. I hate to say it, but it's conceivable that President Xi Jinping would even like that option. He might get the China he's always wanted…

And yes, we would maybe see a first war over Taiwan, and then a second war over Taiwan, possibly a third war over Taiwan. Of course, any of these could go nuclear. We may see larger and larger attempts, bloodier and bloodier, of course, for the people on Taiwan, but also for our side and the Chinese side too.

These would be, in scale, somewhat similar to the world wars and could have those kinds of devastating losses. But Bob, I just want to, again, underline what you said twice. For the Chinese, this is a civil war. And in a way that's their ace in the hole. We talk a lot about certain asymmetries in capabilities. But here, what's critical to understand is the asymmetry in interest. To put it plainly, they care a lot more about this than we do, and than we ever will, and frankly, than we should. To my estimate, this is a small island off of China with some complex history. It is not, in my estimate, the crucible on which we, you know, should bank the future of US national security. So, I'm advising caution, even extreme caution. 

Note: The following excerpt is taken from the Overtime segment available to paid subscribers.

Lyle: I'm kind of shocked, but a lot of American strategists seem to fixate on this issue of amphibious assault ships and say, “Well, China just doesn't have nearly as many as they need.” And I think they really don't understand Chinese military culture… 

Actually, I think the Pentagon may get this better, because there they talk about civil-military fusion as an incredibly core point for PLA [People’s Liberation Army] operations going forward… This is, effectively, people's war applied to amphibious warfare, where you bring in the coast guard, you bring in the fishing fleet, and yes, you bring in that enormous merchant fleet. Of course, China has most of the biggest ports in the world. They're extremely advanced. So, I don't doubt that they can put all this stuff in order…

My vision of how this unfolds… For one: [China will have] an immense reliance on these kinds of civilian shipping. It's not high tech. It’s mostly putting boats over the side. Can you move a tank onto a fishing boat? That's hard. But I don't think they need to do that actually… 

Moving tanks ashore is kind of specialized; you need a specialized vessel, and they're not easy to get aboard a ship. But if you're just moving infantry, good old infantry, [that’s different]. And by the way, who has been the foremost hero of the Ukraine war other than the drone operators? The infantry. We've seen again that infantry somehow dominate the 21^st-century battlefield, partly because they have been given immense firepower, and a foxhole does pretty decently.

The point is this: If you look at the geography of Taiwan, it's actually much more suitable for infantry combat than Ukraine. And the Chinese know this… It's about infantry going over the side in small boats who don't have nearly the logistics tail that armor involves. They don't need fuel. They just need food and water and bullets and some anti-tank gear and so forth. And of course, they'll have air cover, very substantial air cover. That's what all those helicopters are about. China is working very hard on making its Air Force better at ground attack. That has been a difficulty for them, but they're working on it very hard. 

And the last piece I'll just mention, Bob, about my vision and why it differs from the CSIS [Center for Strategic & International Studies] vision. They’re very dismissive of China's airborne capabilities and helicopter capabilities. I've been watching this very closely. It’s amazing how many people China is pushing out of planes on parachutes these days. It's every single service. The Chinese Air Force does it, the Chinese Marines do it, the Chinese Navy does it, and the Chinese Army, of course. It's an immense effort to put people in parachutes. And behind that, they have a vast fleet of helicopters. I think they're well over 1,000 these days that can be brought to bear here. 

And this scenario is very amenable to helicopter assault, partly again because of Taiwan's complex geography…

Bob: And just to be clear, these helicopters can leave from China's mainland, right?

Lyle: Yeah, yeah, unrefueled. They practice with additional fuel tanks on the helicopters, but they don't need them to get across the strait. It's literally a 30-minute jump, 90 miles, and they can get around to every corner of the island. Now, again, CSIS really minimizes that factor. I don't think that's defensible…

Between the helicopters and the airborne troops coming by parachute, I calculate that China would have up to 50,000 soldiers on the island in the first 24 hours without landing any ships at all. And that's a large force that can take the beaches from behind. And that's exactly what they're going to do, along with some fishing ports and so forth, and they will start to flow in materials that way. 

Bob: So, they'll secure the landing areas before the ships show up in your estimation?

Lyle: Exactly.